Pay for Performance: Do Higher Expense Ratios of Levered and Inverse ETFs Lead to Lower Tracking Error? by Carrier, Grant
The University of Maine
DigitalCommons@UMaine
Honors College
Winter 2018
Pay for Performance: Do Higher Expense Ratios of
Levered and Inverse ETFs Lead to Lower Tracking
Error?
Grant Carrier
University of Maine
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/honors
Part of the Accounting Commons, Business Administration, Management, and Operations
Commons, and the Finance and Financial Management Commons
This Honors Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UMaine. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors College by
an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UMaine. For more information, please contact um.library.technical.services@maine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carrier, Grant, "Pay for Performance: Do Higher Expense Ratios of Levered and Inverse ETFs Lead to Lower Tracking Error?" (2018).
Honors College. 559.
https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/honors/559
PAY FOR PERFORMANCE: DO HIGHER EXPENSE RATIOS OF LEVERED 
AND INVERSE ETFS LEAD TO LOWER TRACKING ERROR? 
by 
Grant Carrier 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for a Degree with    
Honors 
(Business Administration in Accounting and Finance) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Honors College 
University of Maine 
December 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Advisory Committee: 
Stephen Jurich, Ph.D., Professor of Finance, Chair 
Matthew Skaves, MBA, CFA, Lecturer in Finance 
Wendy Coons, MSA, CPA, CMA, Lecturer in Accounting 
David Barrett, MA, CPA, Lecturer in Accounting 
Mark Haggerty, Ph.D., Professor of Economics, Honors College 
  
 ABSTRACT 
Levered and inverse Exchange Traded Funds (LETFs) are a recent and controversial 
innovation in financial engineering. These ETFs set out to achieve daily returns that are a 
multiple (2x, 3x) or negative multiple (-1x, -2x, -3x) of an underlying index. Since their 
inception in 2006, research has overwhelmingly concluded that these ETFs fail to meet 
their stated objectives over long holding periods. However, there has been debate over the 
causes of this error, and the holding period at which the tracking begins to break down. 
 
This thesis sets out to analyze the relationship between the expense ratios of LETFs and 
their tracking error. Influenced by the methods of Bansal and Marshall (2015) as well as 
Lu, Wang, and Zang (2012), I calculate tracking error of LETFs and use regression analysis 
to estimate changes in tracking error attributable to changes in expense ratio. The sample 
is analyzed by each target multiple, and analysis is performed for holding periods of 1, 5, 
10, 21, 63, and 126-days. 
 
Through the research process, I find that for -1x, -3x (HP: 126 days) and 2x LETFs, paying 
a higher expense ratio can produce lower levels of tracking error. The data also supports 
previous research claiming LETFs tracking error increases as holding period increases. 
Results did vary for some holding periods and target multiples. Varying results are likely 
due to the effects of compounding on LETF returns and market conditions like volatility 
and direction of returns. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 ETF’s History 
 
One of the most significant innovations of financial engineering in recent years has 
been the creation of exchange traded funds (ETFs). It all started in 1993 with the very first 
ETF Standard & Poor’s Depository Receipts, commonly referred to as “spiders.” What was 
unique about spiders, was its ability to replicate the performance of the S&P 500 index 
while taking the form of a single security that is traded like a stock (Gastineau and 
Marshall, 2011). By the early 2000’s, index-tracking ETFs were common, with many 
sponsor companies releasing their own. Sponsors also added ETFs that tracked other 
popular indexes, like the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the Nasdaq 100. The creation 
of ETFs offered a cheaper, more liquid, way to get exposure to markets when compared to 
alternatives like index-mutual funds. 
The main benefits of an ETF over a mutual fund comes from flexibility and 
expenses. ETFs typically have a very low expense ratio as compared to mutual funds, 
which can have expense ratios nearing 10%. ETFs will also never have commission 
expenses or any kinds of loads, which make it much easier to get a “mutual fund” level of 
exposure for a much cheaper price. Lastly, ETFs can be traded throughout the day like 
stocks, so they are a more liquid instrument than mutual funds, especially close-ended 
funds which can only trade at the end of each day after NAV is calculated. 
It was found by Agapova (2011) that ETFs and conventional index funds are 
substitutes, although not perfect substitutes. The introduction of ETFs contributed more to 
market completeness and opened up a new option for investors to use, but it did not shake 
the mutual fund market enough to replace them. As of 2018, the total net assets of US 
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investment companies for respective instruments was $18.7 trillion in mutual funds and 
$3.4 trillion in exchange traded funds. Those numbers are up from where they were in 
2010, $5.7 trillion and $1 trillion respectively (Investment Company Institute, 2018). Since 
1993, there have been more than 1,500 ETFs introduced in the US and over 5,000 around 
the world. This shows just how much ETFs have skyrocketed onto the mainstage of 
financial trading. 
 
1.2 LETF Development 
It didn’t take long after the early popularity of ETFs for someone to engineer a 
financial derivative using ETFs. In 2006, the first leveraged and inverse ETFs (LETFs) 
were introduced. These LETFs were designed to perform at a multiple of their underlying 
index. So a levered S&P 500-tracking ETF with a multiple of 2 would hypothetically give 
an investor two times the return of the S&P 500 for that day. If the S&P 500 were to go up 
$10, and if an investor were to have one unit of this LETF, then that investor’s position 
should increase by $20. The first LETFs were offered by ProFund Advisors LLC and were 
for multiples of 2x, -1x and -2x. Since then, the number has increased significantly, with 
many sponsors getting into the mix. There has also been the addition of 3x and -3x target 
LETFs. 
There have been multiple studies that have shown these levered and inverse ETFs 
do not perform in-line with their benchmarks over the long term. There is debate over 
when this performance breaks down, but it has been accepted that any holding period 
longer than one year would result in an inaccurate return compared to the stated multiple 
(Lu, Wang and Zhang (2012).  Sponsor websites provide additional information on the 
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performance and structure of their levered and inverse ETFs. They also explicitly state 
that LETFs are not for the casual investor and should be traded by experienced 
professionals only. Here is an example of a warning from Direxion’s website regarding 
their LETF – Direxion Daily S&P 500 Bull 2x Shares (SPUU):  
“This leveraged ETF seeks a return that is 200% the return of its 
benchmark index for a single day. The fund should not be expected to 
provide two times the return of the benchmark’s cumulative return 
for periods greater than a day” 
A sponsor’s website for each LETF outlines much more than just this warning. It has 
performance metrics, objectives, as well as a link to their prospectus, fact sheet, daily 
holdings and other descriptive information. The prospectus for SPUU and daily holdings 
for a different LETF, Proshares UltraShort QQQ (QID), can be found at Appendix D and 
E respectively. The prospectus includes more detailed information on the fund and also 
further explains the risks of the LETF. The fact sheet includes information on the LETFs  
holdings and can provide a detailed understanding of what these LETFs are made of. One 
thing to note here is how Direxion names their LETFs as compared to their competitor 
ProShares. They explicitly state in the name that it is the Daily negative two times return 
of the S&P 500. This is both an effort to be more transparent to their customers and an 
extra encouragement to use these instruments for daily trading. 
Interestingly, because these levered ETFs are designed to only produce their 
multiple for a day, they have much higher trading volumes than traditional ETFs. The 
experienced professionals that are tasked with trading these instruments understand the risk 
of LETFs, so they often will sell their shares at the end of the day. In the United States 
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during 2009, leveraged ETFs accounted for almost 40% of the total trading volume of ETFs 
(both traditional ETFs and LETFs). This is an impressive amount because at this time, and 
still today, traditional ETFs account for a much larger share of the total Assets Under 
Management (AUM) of all ETFs. For example, the SPDR S&P500 ETF, the largest 
traditional ETF, had $224.82 billion in AUM in 2016, and the largest leveraged ETF in this 
study’s data set is $3.58 billion (Statista, 2017). So, although much more of the money is 
placed in traditional ETF’s, the LETFs are traded much more frequently because they are 
typically not treated as buy and hold instruments.  
 
1.3 LETF Structure and Rebalancing 
One major reason why levered and inverse ETFs can achieve their target multiple 
for a day, but not for a long period, is due to daily rebalancing. The following section 
explains the levered ETF structure, how levered ETFs are rebalanced, and how levered 
ETFs lose their target multiple as time goes on. 
First, understand that ETFs are not traded as funds, or shares, but as units. So, let’s 
say we have a theoretical LETF named “Fox.” It is designed to do 2x the S&P 500 index, 
and it begins with a price of $100 per unit. If an investor buys one unit of Fox at $100, then 
the fund sponsor will borrow another $100 and invest the investor’s money and the 
borrowed money ($200) into the S&P. If the S&P goes up 3% that day, then the investor 
is at $206. If the investor does not rebalance, then the investor won’t borrow anymore, and 
his or her leverage multiple will now be $206/$106 or 1.94 rather than 2.00. As each day 
passes, this gets more and more skewed, and the return begins to look very ugly.  
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To incorporate rebalancing, we must bring in another variable and that is index 
price. Say that the index stands at 1000 at the beginning of all of this. Just like before, the 
investor starts with $100 and the sponsor borrows another $100, with a 3% increase the 
index would grow to 1030. If a fund does rebalance, the sponsor would end up with the 
$206, then subtract the $100 borrowed to get $106 worth of equity for the investor. Now, 
on day two the sponsor must borrow $106 to match investor equity in order to maintain the 
multiple of 2 and each unit now has $212 invested in the index. Suppose, on day two the 
index decreases 4%, to 988.8. The $212 also decreases by 4% and comes down to $203.52. 
Once the sponsor subtracts the $106 borrowed they end up with $97.52 investor equity 
which is an 8% decline from $106 where the investor began the day. This is exactly twice 
the 4% decline, so the daily objective is met once again. However, when you look at the 
results over the two days, you see that the overall change does not meet the benchmark 
multiple. Over the two days the index went from 1000 to 988.8, a decrease of 1.12%. So 
with the multiple of two, the investor would expect Fox to come down 2.24%, or twice the 
decrease from the index. However, the decrease in investor equity from $100 to $97.52 is 
a 2.48% decrease. 
This relative shortfall in performance over longer holding periods has been well 
documented (Mackintosh, 2008; Trainor and Baryla, 2008). Because of this, levered and 
inverse ETFs have been labeled as inherently dangerous, but I believe they are important 
to having a complete and competitive market. Because it has only been 12 years since their 
creation, there is still a lot for us to learn about these unique financial instruments. As 
mentioned above, tracking error and holding period return has been the focus of most ETF 
research, but what about the price you pay for them? 
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1.4 Expense Ratios 
 Levered and inverse ETFs pay for their expenses through a charged expense ratio, 
typically an annual percentage of your investment. This pays for managers salaries, 
transaction costs, marketing, administration, and any other operating expenses of the funds. 
A fund’s annual report provides more information on these expenses and how they come 
together to create the percentage they report. The ProShares 2018 Annual Report explains 
their administration and Custodian fees to J.P. Morgan Chase, the Listing, Data and Related 
fees for listing their funds on exchanges, as well as the $185,000 Trustee fee paid annually 
to each individual trustee for their services as a Board member.  
A fund must set an expense ratio so investors know the price they are paying for 
their investment. Although they must charge the set expense ratio, LETF’s replication 
strategies often create varying expenses that can be larger than anticipated. If expenses 
become greater than what the stated expense ratios can cover, then the fund “waives” or 
“reimburses” these expenses and the fund’s net income decreases. A fund can recoup these 
losses over a five-year period, limited to the lesser of the expense limitation at the time of 
recoupment or the expense limitation at the time of waiver/reimbursement (Proshares, 
2018). This means that if an LETF had an expense ratio of 0.90% in 2016 and expenses of 
1.00% it would waive 0.10% of expenses resulting in a loss of 0.10%. If it increased its 
expense ratio to 1.00% in 2017 but only had expenses up to 0.89% it could recoup its loss 
from 2016 but only 0.01%. A LETF could set a higher expense ratio for a longer period 
and pass on more of their expenses to the investor but would likely suffer more by 
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decreasing the fund’s competitiveness. As mentioned earlier, a low expense ratio is one of 
the main advantage’s ETFs have over mutual funds. Because of this, it is important to keep 
these ratios as low as possible. 
 LETFs that have a more complicated, and therefore more expensive, replication 
strategy would be expected to have higher expense ratios. This can be observed in the 
sample of this Thesis. The funds with a lower target ratio typically have lower expense 
ratios. The inverse (-1x) ETFs have the lowest expense ratios of all. These funds don’t have 
to use leverage and can enter low cost short positions on the underlying index or ETF. The 
triple levered (3x) and triple inverse (-3x) have the highest expense ratios in the sample, 
due to the cost of obtaining this leverage.  
 As a fund’s Assets Under Management (AUM) grow over time, the fund is 
sometimes able to decrease its expense ratio. ProShares UltraPro S&P500, a 3x LETF, had 
an expense ratio of 0.95% from 2014-2017, with AUM from approximately $559 million 
and $880 million. The fund was able to drop its expense ratio to 0.92% in 2018 as its AUM 
increased to $1.4 billion (Proshares, 2018). However, AUM can fluctuate by a large amount 
from year to year and any change in expense ratio must be approved by the fund’s board 
of directors, so changes like this are less frequent and relatively insignificant. 
 
1.5 Importance 
The first reason this Thesis provides value is that it explores the importance of 
expense ratio and performance over different holding periods. There is literature that 
suggests LETFs can track their index accurately for up to 6-months (Hill and Foster, 2009) 
or even a year (Lu, Wang, and Zhang, 2012). If an investor agrees and wants to use a LETF 
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as a buy and hold instrument, expense ratio could be of more importance. However, day 
traders can be just as sensitive to expenses. No significant relationship between expense 
ratio and tracking error over short holding periods would show to a daily investor that 
paying the lowest expense ratio is worth it because it will not affect daily return.  
Another reason is that it provides an analysis into expense ratios over a recent 
period. Much of the research previously done on LETFs does not focus on their expense 
ratios and tracking error. Lots of LETF research was done soon after their inception in the 
late 2000s and early 2010s, during high volatility as a result of the financial crisis, and a 
period of market development as LETFs were being created and also dissolved. Since 2010, 
the market cap of ETFs has increased from about $1 trillion to nearly $3.5 trillion today. 
This has increased liquidity and performance of LETFs, according to Osterhoff and 
Kaserer, (2016). As these LETFs become more prevalent and efficient, expense ratios may 
become a higher point of interest for future research.  
Lastly, previous research (Lu, Wang, and Zhang, 2012; Elton, Gruber, Comer and 
Li, 2002; and Dorocakova, 2017; among others) has focused on popular LETFs that track 
common indexes like the S&P 500, the Dow Jones Industrial Average, and the Russell 
2000. The sample for this Thesis includes a variety of LETFs tracking a variety of indexes 
including the S&P Small Cap 600 Index and the Russell 1000 Financial Services Index, to 
name a few. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW & HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Tracking Error and Holding Period 
 
Most of the literature on LETFs labels them as a dangerous investment, with some 
going as far as warning investors to avoid them completely. The common conclusion of 
finance research is that LETFs underperform their underlying benchmarks due to the 
compounding effect. This is based on the principle that the geometric mean (average 
return) of a series of numbers will be lower for a series that has greater variance. LETFs 
are designed to create more variance in the form of higher or lower returns as defined by 
their target multiple. As a simple example, assume you have $100 in a 2x LETF. It had a 
20% decrease to $80 when the index decreased 10%. The next day a 10% increase causes 
the index to increase from $90 to $99 and the LETF from $80 to $96. The fact that the 
index fails to return to $100 is evidence of the compounding problem, while the LETF 
ending at $96 explains the exacerbation of this effect due to leverage. As each day passes 
and the index rises and falls, this problem contributes to increasing tracking error. 
Charuput and Miu (2011) use regression analyses to find that tracking error for 
LETFs increases with a longer holding period. More specifically, they identified that after 
a holding period of one week, expected returns often begin to deteriorate. After a one-
month holding period, actual returns can vary significantly from target returns.  
Lu, Wang, and Zhang (2012) conclude that the “2x” target LETFs can perform to 
twice their underlying index’s returns for a holding period of up to 1 year. They also 
discover that the “-2x” LETFs relationship with its underlying index breaks down after just 
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one quarter. These results seem to agree with those from Charupat and Miu (2011) that 
bearish LETFs have significantly more tracking error on average than bullish funds.  
 
2.2 Tracking Error and Volatility 
Avellaneda and Zhang (2010) find that for their sample of 56 LETFs tracking error 
is higher during periods of high volatility. Their conclusion is that it takes a LETF more 
round-trip transactions to achieve the desired leverage in a period of high volatility. As the 
number of transactions increase, the compounding effects on returns become more 
significant. The article ends with an addendum stating regulators had recently issued 
notices concerning the suitability of LETFs as buy-and-hold investments. 
Holzhauer, Lu, McLeod and Mehran (2013) also conclude that expected market 
volatility, as measured by the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX), 
has significant effects on the daily tracking error of LETFs. They also find that these effects 
are stronger as target multiples increase, and strongest for inverse ETFs. Although their 
sample is from 2006 to 2009, a period where the VIX hit an all-time high, they are able to 
show that higher volatility is related to worse tracking error. 
 As foreshadowed by the addendum in Avellaneda and Zhang (2010), regulators 
now require fund sponsors to explain the effects of volatility on their stated or expected 
returns in a fund’s prospectus. The figure below, from ProShares UltraProQQQ’s 
prospectus, shows estimated fund returns while assuming 1) no dividends paid, 2) no Fund 
expenses, and 3) borrowing/lending rates of 0%. 
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Figure 1: Chart from ProShares UltraPro QQQ showing volatility effects on returns 
 
A table like this can be found in every LETF’s prospectus. Notice how even a low 
volatility rate can create huge fluctuations as returns increase and decrease. At 10% market 
volatility, a 40% decrease in the index would result 41% underperformance to target for a 
3x ETF. Although it is unlikely a casual investor would read this, it is evidence of regulators 
attempting to increase transparency and openness to the risks of LETF trading as a result 
of research explaining these deficiencies.  
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2.3 Tracking Error and Compounding Effects 
The effects of compounding that cause a difference between target and actual 
returns are more significant in rising markets than in falling markets. Abner (2010) 
provides an example of how a “2x” levered ETF can outperform its underlying index 
significantly over a 10-day holding period in a trending market. Tables and graphs of his 
example showing performance deviation over 10 days for rising, “flat”, and dipping 
markets are featured in the figures below.  
Figure 2: LETF performance in 10% per day rising market (Abner, 2010) 
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An index with 10% increases over 10 days would expect to have a 159% cumulative 
change over that period. A “2x” LETF should produce twice as much as its benchmark, or 
20% returns per day over the same period. One would expect this to result in 318% 
increase, however 20% returns over 10 days produce cumulative returns of 519%.  
Figure 3: LETF performance in a flat market (Abner, 2010) 
 
The difference in 10-day cumulative change for a flat market, going up 10% and 
down 10% every other day, would be -4.90% for a benchmark, and would be -18.46% for 
the “2x” LETF, as opposed to the intuitive -9.8%. As you can see in the chart, expected 
ETF returns would be better at first, but as time goes on, compounding causes those returns 
to become worse and worse. 
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Figure 4: LETF performance in 10% per day dipping market (Abner, 2010) 
 
The LETF here ends up with less underperformance than expected (-89% rather 
than -130%), however, mathematically it is impossible for the index or ETF to hit a value 
below zero. As the market dips 10% each day, that dip becomes infinitely smaller and 
smaller. This is the reason that the compounding effect is less significant in a dipping 
market than a rising one. 
This is an extreme example and uses mathematics as opposed to empirical data, but 
the concept remains the same. The compounding effects on returns of LETFs is an 
important concept for investors to consider when looking at putting money into LETF’s. 
However, all LETFs within a target group have to deal with this disadvantage, and Lu, 
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Wang, Zhang (2012) show that this compounding effect can be mitigated for periods up to 
1 year.  
 
2.4 Tracking Error and Dividend Distributions 
 
Elton, Gruber, Comer and Li (2002) analyzed the spider (SPY) ETF and find that 
ETFs underperform their underlying index because of transaction costs and holding 
dividend distributions in cash accounts. Gastineau (2004) also found underperformance of 
inverse or levered ETF to be attributable to their handling of dividend distributions.  
A LETF may have holdings of the securities that make up its benchmark index. An 
example of a LETF with holdings of the underlying securities is provided by ProShares 
(2018). The annual report shows that ProShares UltraPro QQQ generated its 3x multiple 
by using 76% exposure in underlying securities, 214% in swaps and 10% futures. Some 
funds will accumulate dividends paid by those securities into cash accounts. The time they 
sit in cash accounts before getting reinvested, if they are ever reinvested, can result in an 
opportunity loss and variation from the index. Elton, Gruber, Comer and Li (2002) show 
that 9.95 basis points of underperformance for Spiders was attributable to holding 
dividends in cash accounts. 
Charupat and Miu (2014) explain that typically funds will use those dividend 
distributions to help offset management fees and then will distribute any remaining money 
to the unit holders. These dividends are likely used to cover the “waived” or “reimbursed” 
expenses that the fund suffered and are unable to recoup in the future. 
 
 
 
 16 
2.5 Tracking Error and Expense Ratio 
 
Agapova (2011) determined that the introduction of ETFs created a substitute for 
conventional index funds. Within the sample of 11 ETFs and 171 conventional index funds, 
she finds that ETFs have lower tracking error, net of fees. Because ETFs are able to offer 
much lower expense ratios than conventional index funds, often at levels of 0.2-0.4% or 
lower, less of the variance is attributable to the expense ratio. As any financial instrument’s 
expense ratio increases, it eats away at a small percentage of return and although index 
funds may track the index more accurately, the price you pay for that accuracy is not better 
than the extremely small price you pay for an ETF.  
Rompotis (2011) concludes that his sample of 27 ETFs can better perform or match 
the performance of their underlying index for a period of a year or longer. He also attributes 
tracking error to expenses of the fund, as well as age and risk of the ETF. Through 
regression analysis, Rompotis finds that a higher expense ratio will significantly affect the 
tracking error of the fund, but admits it is not the only contributing factor. Because the 
expense ratio of ETFs can have an impact on their tracking ability, it could also be the case 
for LETFs as well. Levered and inverse ETFs also have higher expense ratios than regular 
or “plain vanilla” ETFs. If there is a relationship between expense ratio paid and tracking 
ability, the value may be more significant for LETF investors. 
Due to the previous research on LETFs and tracking error, as well as ETFs and their 
expense ratio as it relates to tracking error, I believe there could be a significant relationship 
between expense ratios and tracking error of LETFs. Revealing a relationship between the 
two in this Thesis would provide a basis for further research into expense ratios and 
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performance. Although expense ratios of LETFs are relatively low when compared to other 
securities, paying for performance should always be a focus of investors. 
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3. RESEARCH QUESTION & HYPOTHESES 
 
As I learned about levered ETFs in BUA 353 in the Fall of 2017, I was intrigued 
by these unique instruments. The ability to earn 3x returns on the S&P 500 as markets were 
rising with each day had me thinking of huge percentage returns above those who invested 
in the index. Soon we learned these LETFs may not be what they seem and can have 
significant return variance from its target. I began thinking to research on actively vs. 
passively managed mutual funds. Paying higher expense ratios for actively managed funds 
has proven to be fruitless in most cases. Because of this, I thought there could be something 
worth exploring in expense ratios of LETFs and their returns.  
 
QUESTION: 
Does a higher expense ratio of a leveraged or inverse ETF lead to better 
performance of that ETF? Where performance is based on return relative to 
their underlying benchmark (tracking error). 
 
From this question, and an evaluation of the literature on ETFs and LETFs, I was 
able to develop three hypotheses to test. 
 
Hypothesis #1: Paying for a higher expense ratio will produce higher tracking error for 
levered and inverse ETFs. 
 
From the work of Agapova (2011) on ETFs and index funds, and Rompotis (2011) 
on ETF performance, I believe that a higher expense ratio will eat away at returns and 
produce a higher tracking error for the LETF. A low expense ratio could be the separation 
in performance of LETFs with similar objectives. As compounding and volatility affect all 
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LETFs, and most handle dividend distributions in a similar way, the price you pay may be 
the only way to reduce tracking error. If I uncover a significant positive relationship 
between expense ratio and tracking error, this hypothesis would be proven true. 
  
Hypothesis #2: The higher a levered or inverse ETF’s target multiple, the higher its 
tracking error will be. 
 
According to Charupat and Miu (2014) the effects of compounding are more severe 
for LETFs with higher target ratios. The compounding effect is one of the most significant 
reasons that LETFs fail to meet their target multiple over holding periods longer than a 
day. Holzhauer, Lu, McLeod and Mehran (2013) also claim the negative effects of 
volatility on tracking error are more significant for LETFs with higher target ratios. 
Because the compounding effect and effects of volatility are exacerbated for LETFs with 
higher target ratios, I expect to find the -3x and 3x LETFs to have higher tracking error 
than all other target groups. 
 
Hypothesis #3: Those with bearish (bullish) multiples will have worse (better) tracking 
error and higher (lower) expense ratios. 
 
The work of Lu, Wang, and Zang (2012) showed that expected returns of LETFs 
begin to break down after one quarter for -2x LETFs but not until a year for a 2x LETF. 
Along with Charupat and Miu (2011) findings that bearish funds have higher tracking error 
than bullish, I believe that the inverse ETFs will have higher tracking error than their 
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levered counterparts. Additionally, Charupat and Miu (2014) explain that bearish LETFs 
must face higher transactional costs and therefore have higher expense ratios, so I believe 
these funds will have higher expense ratios than bullish LETFs. 
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4. SAMPLE SELECTION & METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Data 
The sample of 54 levered and inverse ETFs from 2017 were pulled from ETF.com. 
This was a reliable first source for information on the LETFs. The website has brief 
descriptions of the funds as well as links to their websites. Data for AUM, expense ratio, 
and spread for the LETFs was also taken from ETF.com and descriptive statistics for this 
data can be found in Table 1 below. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics – AUM, Expense Ratios, Spread 
 
The table reports the descriptive statistics of all 54 LETFs for the year 2017. AUM 
represents Assets Under Management in millions of dollars. AUM is calculated by 
summing the market value of all securities, derivatives and swaps agreements owned by 
the fund. The expense ratio is the price paid to cover expenses of the fund, expressed as a 
percentage of investment. Spread is the difference between a LETF’s Ask and Bid price 
at a given time.  
 
After the sampling of LETFs was completed, transaction level data for the LETFs 
was obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Agapova (2011), 
Elton, Gruber, Comer and Li (2002), Lu, Wang, and Zhang (2012), and many others have 
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Full, n= 54      
AUM $435.85 $137.49 708.31819 $2.06 $3,580 
Expense Ratio 0.96% 0.95% 0.000953 0.56% 1.11% 
Spread 0.18% 0.09% 0.00193 0.02% 0.84% 
Panel A: Leveraged     
2x, n= 12      
AUM 556.31 167.20 811.21 3.57 2,510.00 
Expense Ratio 0.90% 0.95% 0.10% 0.67% 0.95% 
Spread 0.14% 0.08% 0.18% 0.02% 0.62% 
3x, n= 13      
AUM 859.11 622.84 1,027.88 38.77 3,580.00 
Expense Ratio 1.00% 0.95% 0.06% 0.95% 1.11% 
Spread 0.13% 0.10% 0.12% 0.02% 0.36% 
Panel B: Inverse     
-1x, n= 7      
AUM 330.29 260.39 491.54 4.73 1,400.00 
Expense Ratio 0.89% 0.95% 0.15% 0.56% 0.95% 
Spread 0.09% 0.04% 0.11% 0.03% 0.32% 
-2x, n= 11      
AUM 126.18 26.66 246.00 2.34 829.78 
Expense Ratio 0.94% 0.95% 0.02% 0.89% 0.95% 
Spread 0.33% 0.25% 0.28% 0.03% 0.84% 
-3x, n= 11      
AUM 181.06 128.13 164.00 2.06 419.32 
Expense Ratio 1.02% 0.95% 0.09% 0.90% 1.11% 
Spread 0.16% 0.09% 0.16% 0.04% 0.58% 
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used CRSP for accurate and expansive U.S. ETF historical data. Because of this and the 
access granted from my advisor, I decided that CRSP would be the most adequate source. 
“Plain vanilla” ETFs data also came from CRSP, so all return data could come from a 
single and reliable source. The data for both the LETFs and plain ETFs collected from 
CRSP included daily percentage returns, daily volume, price (bid/ask average), company 
name, PERMNO, and number of shares outstanding. 
Appendix A provides a list of the LETFs in the sample. Appendix B provides a 
description and definition of the variables used in the analysis.  
 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The sample included 25 leveraged and 29 inverse ETFs. This is made up of 12 
LETFs with a “2x” target multiple, 13 with a “3x” target, 7 with a “-1x” target, 11 with a 
“-2x” target and 11 with a “-3x” target. The largest expense ratio is 1.11% and belongs to 
the Direxion Daily S&P Biotech Bear 3X Shares, Ticker: LABD (-3x) and the Direxion 
Daily Semiconductor Bear 3x Shares, Ticker SOXS (-3x). Notice here that the LETFs with 
the highest expense ratios are bearish, and three times multiple. This would seem to support 
Charupat and Miu (2014) concept that bearish and high multiple LETFs have higher 
expenses than bull or low multiple LETFs. The lowest expense ratio is 0.56% and belonged 
to Direxion Daily S&P 500 Bear 1X Shares, Ticker: SPDN (-1x). The entire sample has a 
mean expense ratio of 0.96%. Table 2 below provides descriptive statistics for all LETFs 
by target multiple. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics by Target Multiple 
This table reports descriptive statistics of LETFs by target multiple for a 6-month holding 
period. Volume is the number of shares traded in a day. The expense ratio is the price 
paid to cover expenses of the fund. Returns represents the percentage daily returns over 
the time period. Plain Ret represents the return of the underlying or “plain vanilla” ETF. 
Target represents daily expected return of the LETF based on the target multiple. 
Full, n= 6750 Mean Median Std Dev Max Min 
Volume 1,065,924.23 221,756.00 1,964,390.94 22,998,238.00 - 
Expense Ratio 0.00956 0.00950 0.00095 0.01110 0.00560 
Returns -0.00003 -0.00030 0.01724 0.13031 -0.13145 
Plain Ret 0.00092 0.00098 0.00685 0.03110 -0.04406 
Panel A: Leveraged     
2x, n= 1500      
Volume 251,295.97 23,968.5 468,944.45 3,034,047 0 
Expense Ratio 0.00903 0.00950 0.00095 0.00950 0.00670 
Returns 0.00177 0.00140 0.01364 0.08345 -0.07918 
Plain Ret 0.00093 0.00098 0.00659 0.02912 -0.04406 
Target 0.00185 0.00197 0.01317 0.05825 -0.08811 
3x, n= 1625      
Volume 1,040,122 491,151 1,298,868.67 8,679,270 0 
Expense Ratio 0.01000 0.00950 0.00059 0.01110 0.00950 
Returns 0.00251 0.00243 0.02149 0.09372 -0.13145 
Plain Ret 0.00089 0.00093 0.00728 0.03110 -0.04406 
Target 0.00267 0.00278 0.02184 0.09330 -0.13217 
Panel B: Inverse     
-1x, n= 875      
Volume 498,076.48 210,047.00 803,433.92 6,114,375.00 - 
Expense Ratio 0.00886 0.00950 0.00135 0.00950 0.00560 
Returns -0.00084 -0.00093 0.00549 0.02123 -0.02860 
Plain Ret 0.00088 0.00093 0.00549 0.02912 -0.02144 
Target -0.00088 -0.00093 0.00549 0.02144 -0.02912 
-2x, n= 1375      
Volume 736,100.39 23,928.00 1,383,393.82 12,542,116.00 - 
Expense Ratio 0.00945 0.00950 0.00017 0.00950 0.00890 
Returns -0.00190 -0.00202 0.01380 0.07597 -0.06322 
Plain Ret 0.00100 0.00107 0.00680 0.02912 -0.04406 
Target -0.00199 -0.00215 0.01360 0.08811 -0.05825 
-3x, n= 1375      
Volume 2,676,284.97 940,603.00 3,280,456.35 22,998,238.00 - 
Expense Ratio 0.01015 0.00950 0.00082 0.01110 0.00900 
Returns -0.00259 -0.00289 0.02189 0.13031 -0.09414 
Plain Ret 0.00090 0.00097 0.00744 0.03110 -0.04406 
Target1 -0.00270 -0.00290 0.02232 0.13217 -0.09330 
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Note that the sample sizes represent 125 days (6-months) for each LETF. Thus, for 
the “2x” target, n= 1500 because there are 12 LETFs with that target multiple. Target data 
is the “Plain Ret” data multiplied by the funds target multiple. For example, the mean 
“Plain Ret” for 3x is 0.089%, and the Target value is 0.267%, or 0.089% * 3. The minimum 
of 0 for volume shows that on some day(s) there was an LETF that was not traded.  
 Expense ratios are the smallest for the “-1x” LETFs. These seven funds have a 
mean expense ratio of 0.886% and a minimum of 0.56%. These funds don’t need to obtain 
significant leverage and instead provide individual investors a cheaper and simpler way to 
short an index. Of the seven LETFs, six of them are provided by ProShares and one is 
provided by Direxion. The Direxion -1x ETF (ticker: SPDN) has an impressively low 
expense ratio, which is also the lowest in the entire sample at just 0.56%. The six Proshares 
inverse ETFs have expense ratios of 0.95% with the exception of the Proshares Short S&P 
500, (ticker: SH) at 0.89%.  For 2017, SPDN had the highest tracking error of the group. 
SH had the second highest tracking error for the group. The fact that both track the S&P 
500 implies there may be a relationship between the performance or direction of the index 
they track and their tracking error. However, the fact that the inverse ETF with the lowest 
expense ratio produced the highest tracking error is an important anecdotal observation. 
This also differs from the expectations of Charupat and Miu (2014) that the higher an 
LETFs expense ratio, the more it would be expected to underperform its index. 
The 3x and -3x targets are the only fund groups that have expense ratios above 1%. All 
3x LETFs have a mean expense ratio of 1.0% and -3x have a mean of 1.01% These are 
both higher than even the maximum (0.95%) from any other target group.  The 2x grouping 
has a minimum of 0.67% and a mean of 0.903%. Compare this to the -2x target group with 
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a minimum of 0.89% and a mean 0.945%, the higher price paid for the -2x group further 
solidifies the claim from Charupat and Miu (2014) that bearish LETFs face higher 
transactional expenses than other funds. 
 
4.3 Tracking Error 
Tracking error is the measurement for levered and inverse ETF performance. A 
perfectly operating LETF would have a tracking error of 0, any deviation away from zero 
is considered underperformance. Some investors may consider higher than expected return, 
or less negative than expected return as better performance, however a fund’s performance 
should be measured relative to its objective. For this thesis tracking error is calculated using 
this equation: 
𝑇𝐸 = 𝑓𝑡 − (𝐿𝑖𝑡) 
 
Where, 𝑇𝐸 represents tracking error, 𝑓𝑡 is the LETFs actual return, 𝑖𝑡 is plain vanilla ETF 
return, and L is the fund’s target multiple. The study on leveraged ETF performance by 
Bansal and Marshall (2015) uses this equation to find tracking error of 2x and 3x LETFs. 
For a positive target multiple, underperformance is a negative tracking error. However, 
calculating tracking error this way causes a negative target multiple to have a positive 
tracking error when it is underperforming. This may seem complicated, but it is not and 
does not affect the results of my analysis. Simply put, tracking error is the deviation away 
from zero, regardless of sign. Table 3 below reports tracking error descriptive statistics by 
target ratio for a holding period of 1, 5, 10, 21, 63, and 126-days. 
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Table 3: Tracking Error Descriptive Statistics by Target Ratio 
This table reports descriptive statistics for tracking error for the 54 LETFs over various 
holding periods. 
 
Tracking Error Mean Median Std Dev Maximum Minimum 
2x, n= 1500      
1 day -0.00007937 -0.000091 0.0067824 0.058535 -0.07244 
5 days -0.00071683 -0.0004585 0.00929 0.083662 -0.0636 
10 days -0.0013116 -0.0009285 0.0115841 0.055351 -0.06038 
21 days -0.0027446 -0.0018015 0.0150971 0.061067 -0.06772 
63 days -0.006882 -0.0054975 0.0180745 0.082463 -0.0905 
126 days -0.0123738 -0.0102905 0.023951 0.099994 -0.11855 
3x, n= 1625      
1 day -0.00016043 -0.000146 0.0032105 0.027087 -0.02936 
5 days -0.0010025 -0.000794 0.0066257 0.044061 -0.08563 
10 days -0.0019576 -0.001572 0.0093425 0.05073 -0.08036 
21 days -0.0040449 -0.003209 0.0114962 0.067964 -0.09904 
63 days -0.0107976 -0.009203 0.0109889 0.032626 -0.1326 
126 days -0.0179502 -0.01711 0.014373 0.100808 -0.13464 
-1x, n= 875      
1 day 0.000047983 0.00004 0.0015455 0.014679 -0.01089 
5 days 0.000216853 0.000249 0.0014527 0.01083 -0.01137 
10 days 0.000422616 0.000457 0.0015555 0.014606 -0.01176 
21 days 0.000881851 0.000975 0.0018055 0.015796 -0.0169 
63 days 0.0024057 0.002598 0.0025462 0.021834 -0.01475 
126 days 0.0037628 0.003987 0.0033411 0.023806 -0.01263 
-2x, n= 1375      
1 day 0.000087498 0.000103 0.0046316 0.029803 -0.05279 
5 days 0.00057978 0.000383 0.0076694 0.051207 -0.04018 
10 days 0.0011751 0.000779 0.0107661 0.052887 -0.0489 
21 days 0.0025543 0.001531 0.0147531 0.065847 -0.05411 
63 days 0.0059244 0.004708 0.0173649 0.083787 -0.06719 
126 days 0.0091553 0.006424 0.0232801 0.11488 -0.06285 
-3x, n= 1375      
1 day 0.000107489 0.000107 0.0038898 0.027636 -0.03072 
5 days 0.00074352 0.000548 0.007352 0.085123 -0.0444 
10 days 0.0014005 0.001139 0.0103336 0.078199 -0.05056 
21 days 0.0029096 0.002193 0.0127144 0.098132 -0.06994 
63 days 0.0068645 0.006117 0.0124179 0.128537 -0.03996 
126 days 0.0079232 0.007742 0.0175529 0.123266 -0.11148 
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Note that within the columns for mean and median, tracking error increases for all 
target multiples as holding periods increases. For the inverse (-1x) LETFs, the one-day 
holding period has a TE (0.0000479) or .00479%.  However, increasing to a one-week 
holding period shows the tracking error becomes five times greater (0.00021685).  Across 
the data set there is a similar pattern. Not only does tracking error increase, it increases by 
the multiple increase in holding period. This means that tracking error for a 10-day HP to 
a 21-day would nearly double, and from 21-day to 63-day it would be close to triple. To 
show this further, see that the inverse LETFs 20-day HP tracking error is 0.000881 which 
is nearly twice that of the 10-day (0.00021685). The -3x tracking error for a holding period 
of 10-days is 0.00140, and the tracking error for 21-days is 0.00291 - almost three times as 
much. This increasing tracking error over longer holding periods supports the work of 
Charupat and Miu (2011). 
The positive target multiples have higher amounts of tracking error (farther from 
zero) than the negative target multiples. This would vary from the results of Charupat and 
Miu (2014) who state that LETFs with negative target multiples experience higher levels 
of tracking error due to their bearish nature and the transaction costs of creating those 
returns. The inverse (-1x) ETFs had the lowest amount of tracking error for all target groups 
at every holding period. For a holding period of 6 months the inverse group was able to 
average a tracking error of just 0.37% which is nearly three times less than the next closest 
group which was -2x at 0.92%. The inverse group also had a maximum tracking error for 
6 month holding period of 2.38% a much lower maximum than other target groups, 11.86% 
(2x), 13.46% (3x), 11.48% (-2x) and 12.33% (-3x). 
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 The 2x LETFs appear to have less average tracking error than the 3x target group 
throughout the holding periods. The -1x multiple also has less tracking error than -2x and 
-3x target groups. Lastly, the -2x has lower tracking error than the -3x over all holding 
periods, with the exception of 6 months. This would agree with Charupat and Miu (2014) 
and Holzhauer, Lu, McLeod and Mehran (2013) who determined that LETFs with higher 
target ratios will experience higher levels of tracking error.  
 
4.4 Methodology 
This thesis uses a tracking error approach from (Bansal, Marshall 2015) with 
common statistical regression methods to test the impact of expense ratio on tracking error. 
This method differs from tracking error calculations used by Charupat and Miu (2011, 
2014), Agapova (2011), and Shum and Kang (2013) among others, for a reason. Their 
method uses a regression of an ETF or LETF’s change in NAV returns to its underlying 
index change in NAV returns to measure a funds tracking error. However, a fund’s NAV 
is free from any management expenses so there would be no relationship between these 
returns and an LETFs expense ratio (Rompotis, 2011). The approach used in this study 
allows me to use a simpler measure of tracking error and then use regression analysis to 
look for a causal relationship between that error and the LETFs expense ratio.  
4.4.1 “Plain Vanilla” ETF Proxy 
This study also compares the returns of a sample of LETFs to the returns of plain 
vanilla ETFs which track the same indexes as the given LETF. A “plain vanilla” is an 
unlevered ETF that simply tracks an index without leverage. This method is also used by 
Lu, Wang, and Zang (2012) in their testing of leveraged ETF returns. Using plain vanilla 
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ETFs as a proxy is an acceptable analysis method because of their ability to track an index 
more efficiently than conventional index funds. Agapova (2011) claims that the difference 
in means of tracking error between conventional funds and ETFs is significant. The lower 
amount of tracking error for ETFs in her sample suggests that ETFs can track the 
underlying indexes more efficiently than conventional index funds. Agapova also states 
that tracking error is the important factor for investors expecting return of the underlying 
index, which is even more important to investors expecting a stated multiple of return on 
that index. The ability to use plain vanilla ETFs provided important analysis validity by 
allowing us to take all return data from a single source, the Center for Research in Security 
Prices. 
 
4.4.2 Time Period Selection 
Deciding on a time period and duration for the return data was based on Lu, Wang, 
and Zhang (2012) who concluded that a holding period of one year can still produce 
adequate returns for 2x LETFs. Because of these results, I felt that one year would be a 
sufficient maximum period for return data. Later in the thesis process, when we began 
regression analysis on the Statistical Analysis Software, I experienced issues with the size 
of data files going from SAS to Excel. In order to keep data files to a manageable size, I 
did not include the holding period of 1-year in the results. I decided to use holding periods 
of 5, 21, 63, and 126 days because of work done by Charupat and Miu (2014) and Lu, 
Wang & Zhang, (2012). These time periods are also logical benchmarks, one week, one 
month, one quarter, and  
1
2
  year based on trading days. 
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Selecting data from the year 2017 was intended to provide results on recent data. 
Data for only 251 days per LETF aided in keeping data size reasonable (original N=13554). 
As ETF and LETF markets continue to develop, we may be able to uncover information 
that was not found by previous research. Using recent data may help the analysis of 
performance now more than research done previously, because LETF markets are more 
mature and LETFs have become more liquid and better performing as time has passed. 
Using data from a single year in this study serves as a way to observe short- and long-term 
performance while slightly mitigating the effects of trending markets. 
 
4.4.3 Data Preparation  
From the list of LETFs, I copied all tickers into CRSP to produce return data for 
every day of 2017. Due to trading days of the particular year, the data ranges from January 
3, 2017 to December 29, 2017. Along with daily percentage returns, I also pulled daily 
volume, price (bid/ask average), company name, PERMNO, and number of shares 
outstanding data. 
Once sample data was extracted from CRSP and imported to Excel, the next step 
was to match each LETF with the underlying plain vanilla ETF that could serve as a proxy 
for the underlying index. It was imperative to understand exactly which index or plain 
vanilla ETF the fund is tracking. For a LETF like ProShares Short S&P500, it is rather 
obvious it tracks the S&P500, or for the purpose of this study, the ETF ticker: SPY. For 
others, it required searching sponsor and LETF websites to read through prospectuses or 
daily holdings to give more insight into each fund’s structure. However, for some it was 
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challenging and resulted in a decision to remove any LETFs with doubt of target index 
from the data set. 
Once all plain vanilla ETFs were found, their return data was also pulled from 
CRSP and imported to Excel. Next, I added three columns next to the LETF return data 
(𝑓𝑡). The columns are Plain Return (𝑖𝑡), Target (𝐿𝑖𝑡), and Tracking Error (𝑇𝐸). For each 
LETF, I copied all 251 days data of returns for its plain vanilla ETF and pasted it into the 
Plain Return column. Then, to create the data for the Target column, I multiplied the data 
in the Plain Return column by the respective LETF’s target multiple (2x, 3x, -1x, -2x, -3x). 
I followed the equation below for tracking error used by Bansal and Marshall (2015) to 
calculate tracking error in the final column. 
𝑇𝐸 = 𝑓𝑡 − (𝐿𝑖𝑡) 
As mentioned previously, this measure of tracking error produces negative tracking 
error for levered ETFs when they underperform and positive tracking error for inverse 
ETFs. It was not possible to take the absolute value of all negative tracking errors because 
the analysis requires adding tracking error of each day for the holding period to get total 
tracking error for the period. Absolute values of each day would result in an extremely high 
and inaccurate tracking error for levered ETFs. One could take the absolute value of the 
holding period tracking error of an LETF to solve the signage issue. However, that 
complexity would add more work than value and the issue can be addressed with this 
simple explanation and the understanding that for the purpose of this Thesis tracking error 
is the deviation away from 0. 
Once the Excel file was complete with all relevant data for the analysis, the final 
step was to add binary variable columns to help the processing capability of the Statistical 
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Analysis Software, referred to as SAS. To do this I created five new columns in the file, 
pos2, pos3, neg1, neg2, neg3. Next, I used simple “IF” logic, to assign a 1, or 0, in the 
column indicating a “yes” or “no” to that given target ratio. For example, ProShares Ultra 
S&P 500 (Ticker: SSO) has a 2x target multiple, so the formula “=IF(I2155="2x",1,0)” 
where I2155 is a cell within the “Target Ratio” column, will return 1 in the pos2 column 
and 0 in all other columns. Using the simple binary of 0 and 1 helps SAS quickly identify 
the pieces of data required for analysis. 
 
4.4.4 Statistical Analysis Software 
The complete Excel file was imported to SAS for the final descriptive statistics and 
regression analysis. With the help of Thesis Advisor, Dr. Stephen Jurich, I began writing 
the code SAS would use to process the LETF data. The first step was to run descriptive 
statistics for volume, expense ratio, returns, plain returns and target returns on the full 
sample of LETFs as well as each target group. The code for the analysis of the entire sample 
looks like this:   
proc means n mean median std max min data=etf2; 
var volume expense_ratio returns plain_ret target; 
run; quit; 
 
This is telling the system to run the sample size, mean, median, standard deviation, max 
and min analysis for variables volume, expense ratio, returns, plain returns, and target 
within the data set “etf2”. Next, the same analysis would be done but the binary variables 
would be used to sort the data by target multiple, to get more detailed descriptive statistics. 
The code  proc sort data=etf2; by neg1; run; quit; will sort the data to only show 
data for LETFs with a 1 in the neg1 column. A code very similar to the one used for the 
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entire sample is repeated for this set of neg1 LETFs, and the process is repeated for each 
target multiple. These descriptive statistics for the LETFs are combined into Table 2. 
 Next, I used SAS to develop tracking error for holding periods of 5, 10, 21, 63, and 
126 days. The code for this can get complicated. I will explain the process for a five day 
holding period, but note that this process is repeated for each holding period. The code for 
this process will develop an ongoing summation of five day holding periods for each LETF. 
The first measure will be tracking error for days 1-5, the second will be days 2-6, third will 
be 3-7, and so on for 126 days – this process is an example of a lag argument. The code 
looks like this:  
 
 
data etf3; set etf2; 
lag1te=lag1(track_error); 
lag2te=lag2(track_error); 
lag3te=lag3(track_error); 
lag4te=lag4(track_error); 
lag5te=lag5(track_error); 
run; quit; 
 
data etf4; set etf3; 
sum5te = lag1te + lag2te + lag3te + lag4te + lag5te; 
run; quit; 
 
data etf5; set etf4; 
if lag1te ne permno then delete; 
run; quit; 
 
Sum5te is a new variable, representing 5-day holding period tracking error, which 
I will use in SAS to run descriptive statistics and regression analysis. The last section tells 
SAS to delete previous entries where a change in permno is detected. This is to avoid 
calculating tracking error for two different LETFs due to the construction of the return data. 
Creates a new column 
with tracking error -1 
day, -2 days, -3 days, 
etc. 
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Once this process was completed for each holding period, I had variables sum5te, sum10te, 
sum21te, sum63te, and sum126te. 
Using similar code for the descriptive statistics of the LETFs, I was able to quickly 
calculate descriptive statistics for tracking error of different holding periods for all target 
multiples. These statistics are provided in Table 3.  
The last and most important step was to perform the regression analysis on expense 
ratios and tracking error. Because of the work and planning done before hand, this final 
step was simple coding. The regression code is as follows: proc reg data=etf5; model 
sum5te = expense_ratio; by pos2; run; quit; The code written here would give us 
regression results for tracking error and expense ratio for 2x LETFs with a holding period 
of 5 days. This process would be repeated for pos2 sum10te, pos2 sum21te, and so on. And 
then that entire process would be repeated again for every target multiple. All of the final 
regression data was then aggregated into Table 4, which can be found in Section 5 of this 
Thesis. Note that the code above would produce only the results for the top right corner of 
Table 4, 2x target multiple at 5 day holding period. 
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5. RESULTS 
Testing Hypothesis #1 is the main objective of this study and the focus of 
significant casual regression analysis. Hypothesis #2 and Hypothesis #3 are testable based 
on pure observation rather than statistical analysis. For the second two, I observed the 
sample to test if the tracking error and expense ratio data matched trends found in previous 
ETF research. For this Thesis, the regression line equation of  𝑦 = 𝑚𝑥 + 𝑏 labels the 
dependent variable of 𝑦 as tracking error, and independent variable of 𝑥 as expense ratio, 
where 𝑏 is the starting value or intercept for tracking error. Table 4 below reports the 
regression results for expense ratio impact on tracking error of levered and inverse ETFs. 
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Table 4: Regression Results by Target Ratio.  
Regression results where dependent variable = tracking error, independent variable = 
expense ratio. ***, and ** represent significance at the 1%, and 5% level respectively. 
 
Expense Ratio 
Reg 
2x 
Estimate 
(t-stat) 
3x 
Estimate 
(t-stat) 
-1x 
Estimate 
(t-stat) 
-2x 
Estimate 
(t-stat) 
-3x 
Estimate 
(t-stat) 
5 days      
Intercept -0.00001305 0.00005354 0.00067016** -0.00012 -0.00166 
 (-0.01) (0.02) (2.05) (0.01) (-0.68) 
Expense Ratio -0.07791 -0.10561 -0.05118 0.07408 0.23714 
 (-0.31) (-0.38) (-1.4) (0.06) (0.98) 
R-Square 0.0001 0.0001 0.0023 0.00 0.0007 
10 days      
Intercept 0.00286 0.00051548 0.0013*** -0.00095 -0.00366 
 (1.00) (0.13) (3.72) (0.06) (-1.06) 
Expense Ratio -0.46227 -0.24731 -0.09886 0.22479 0.49876 
 (-1.46) (-0.63) (-2.54) (0.13) (1.47) 
R-Square 0.0014 0.0002 0.0073 0.00 0.0016 
21 days      
Intercept 0.00955 0.00181 0.00271*** -0.00403 -0.0082 
 (2.56) (0.37) (6.74) (-0.19) (-1.93) 
Expense Ratio -1.3615*** -0.58537 -0.20633*** 0.69738 1.09415*** 
 (-3.32) (-1.21) (-4.60) (0.30) (2.62) 
R-Square 0.0073 0.0009 0.0237 0.0001 0.005 
63 days      
Intercept 0.02979*** -0.0003531 0.00799*** 0.01186 -0.00925** 
 (6.81) (-0.08) (14.77) (0.46) (-2.24) 
Expense Ratio -4.05923*** -1.04445** -0.63015*** -0.62821 1.58689*** 
 (-8.43) (-2.25) (-10.44) (-0.23) (3.91) 
R-Square 0.0453 0.0031 0.1111 0.00 0.011 
126 days      
Intercept 0.05802*** -0.01217** 0.01363*** 0.04444 0.02637*** 
 (10.28) (-2.00) (20.27) (1.29) (4.50) 
Expense Ratio -7.79249*** -0.5777 -1.11393*** -3.73587 -1.81709*** 
 (-12.54) (-0.95) (-14.84) (-1.03) (-3.16) 
R-Square 0.095 0.0006 0.2015 0.0008 0.0072 
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5.1 -1x Target 
The inverse LETFs showed a significant negative relationship between expense 
ratio and tracking error for holding periods of 21, 63, and 126 days. This refutes Hypothesis 
#1 by showing that paying for a higher expense ratio can decrease tracking error for inverse 
ETFs. According to my results, for a holding period of 21 days, each basis point increase 
in expense ratio would be expected to produce a 0.21% decrease in tracking error. 
Increasing the holding period to 126 days and the same increase could save 1.11% in 
tracking error for the period. This suggests there may be a good reason to pay for a higher 
expense ratio for an inverse ETF if you’re planning to hold it for a period longer than a few 
weeks. This likely has to do with their simple engineering when compared to the LETFs 
that use derivatives contracts to achieve leverage, whereas these ETFs simply take your 
money and flip it by shorting the underlying security. -1x ETFs are lumped in with 
leveraged and inverse ETFs because their objective is different from that of a typical ETF. 
However, they don’t use leverage as -2x, and -3x ETFs do. Because of this, they do not 
have to rebalance daily and therefore do not experience the increased effects of 
compounding due to leverage. There is much less significance in the remaining results, 
which I believe is a sign of the effects of compounding on the sample of LETFs.  
The finding that a higher expense ratio can lead to better performance of an inverse 
ETF may also have significant connection to how the is ETF is constructed. The SPDN 
inverse ETF (Previously discussed in Section 4.2 Descriptive Statistics) had a significantly 
lower expense ratio (0.56%) than most inverse ETFs (Range from 0.89%-0.95%). I believe 
SPDN’s expense ratio is this low because of its simple construction. A look into the daily 
holdings of Direxion Daily S&P500 Bear 1x as of 11/15/2018 is in Figure 5 below. As of 
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that date, the fund consisted of a single shorted S&P 500 Index swap worth $13,418,748 
and a combination of assets to equally offset this liability. 
Figure 5: Direxion Daily S&P500 Bear 1x Daily Holdings, 11/15/2018 
 
 
This framework is much simpler than one like ProShares Short Dow30 (Ticker: DOG). 
DOG’s daily holdings look similar to SPDN’s except for the amount of transactions they 
use and how much cash they hold (Figure 6). DOG also happens to charge a much higher 
expense ratio at 0.95% than SPDN. But, as our results tell us, this more complicated and 
expensive time-deferred maturity framework seems to mitigate tracking error for inverse 
ETFs better than a cheaper method. The details of how managers come to these numbers, 
what each strategy is, and which is more effective is beyond the scope of this Thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Security Description Shares Price Market Value
S&P 500 INDEX SWAP (4,967.00)                   2,701.58        (13,418,747.86)            
BANK OF NEW YORK CASH RESERVE 10,363,306.60           1.00               10,363,306.60             
GOLDMAN FINL SQ TRSRY INST 506 2,905,505.52             1.00               2,905,505.52               
GOLDMAN FINL SQ TRSRY INST 506 4.12                           1.00               4.12                             
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Figure 6: ProShares Short Dow 30 Daily Holdings, 11/15/2018 
 
 The sample of -1x LETFs had less tracking error in all holding periods than the 
higher leveraged -2x and -3x LETFs. These findings agree with Charupat and Miu (2014) 
and confirm Hypothesis #2 that the higher target multiple LETFs will have higher tracking 
error than lower targets. These findings are likely due to the effects of compounding and 
the theory that compounding effects are exacerbated by higher target ratios. 
 
 
 
 
 Security Description  Maturity Date  Shares Price  Market Value
DJ Industrial Average SWAP Goldman Sachs International (3,497)                  (87,694,294)        
DJ Industrial Average SWAP Citibank NA (1,548)                  (38,835,323)        
DJ Industrial Average SWAP Societe Generale (1,035)                  (25,967,823)        
DJ Industrial Average SWAP Credit Suisse International (902)                     (22,618,648)        
DJ Industrial Average SWAP Deutsche Bank AG (785)                     (19,689,045)        
DJIA MINI 12/21/2018 (DMZ8) (115)                     (14,415,250)        
DJ Industrial Average SWAP Bank of America NA (269)                     (6,738,930)          
DJ Industrial Average SWAP UBS AG (134)                     (3,358,329)          
DJ Industrial Average Index SWAP BNP Paribas (40)                       (1,003,220)          
UNITED STATES TREASURY BILL 11/15/18 33,000,000          33,000,000    
UNITED STATES TREASURY BILL 12/13/18 32,000,000          31,946,551    
UNITED STATES TREASURY BILL 1/3/19 25,000,000          24,924,373    
UNITED STATES TREASURY BILL 12/6/18 9,000,000            8,988,575      
UNITED STATES TREASURY BILL 11/23/18 8,000,000            7,996,218      
UNITED STATES TREASURY BILL 11/29/18 7,000,000            6,994,208      
UNITED STATES TREASURY BILL 12/20/18 7,000,000            6,985,351      
UNITED STATES TREASURY BILL 12/27/18 7,000,000            6,981,931      
UNITED STATES TREASURY BILL 1/31/19 5,000,000            4,975,563      
UNITED STATES TREASURY BILL 2/28/19 5,000,000            4,966,057      
UNITED STATES TREASURY BILL 3/28/19 5,000,000            4,956,636      
UNITED STATES TREASURY BILL 1/10/19 4,000,000            3,986,109      
UNITED STATES TREASURY BILL 1/17/19 4,000,000            3,984,250      
UNITED STATES TREASURY BILL 2/7/19 4,000,000            3,978,510      
UNITED STATES TREASURY BILL 2/14/19 4,000,000            3,976,479      
UNITED STATES TREASURY BILL 1/24/19 3,000,000            2,986,729      
UNITED STATES TREASURY BILL 2/21/19 3,000,000            2,980,992      
UNITED STATES TREASURY BILL 3/7/19 3,000,000            2,978,253      
UNITED STATES TREASURY BILL 3/14/19 3,000,000            2,976,882      
UNITED STATES TREASURY BILL 3/21/19 3,000,000            2,975,404      
Net Other Assets / Cash 220,252,007        220,252,007  
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5.2 -2x Target 
For any holding period, there is no significant relationship found between expense 
ratio and tracking error for the -2x target group. There are many potential explanations for 
this result, however my expectation is this result is due to the unity in expense ratios for 
the -2x group. All eleven of the LETFs except for one have an expense ratio of 0.95%, the 
other has an expense ratio of 0.89%. Because there was very little variation in expense 
ratios, it is difficult to find a statistically significant connection between this price and the 
tracking error. 
 The sample of -2x LETFs had more tracking error in all holding periods than their 
lower leveraged -1x cohorts as well as less tracking error than the more levered -3x target 
group. This agrees with Charupat and Miu (2014) as well as Hypothesis #2 that the higher 
target multiple LETFs will have higher tracking error than lower targets. 
In regard to Hypothesis #3, the -2x LETFs had less tracking error in all holding 
periods than their bullish counterparts but they also had higher expense ratios than the 2x 
target group. At a holding period of 126 days, -2x LETFs had a mean tracking error of 
0.91%, and the 2x LETFs had a mean tracking error of 1.24% over the same period. Table 
3 reports tracking error data. This would refute the claim of Charupat and Miu (2011) and 
Lu, Wang, and Zhang (2012) that bearish funds have more tracking error than bullish. 
However, when looking at expense ratios of -2x and 2x in Table 2, the mean -2x expense 
ratio is 0.945% and the 2x is 0.903%. The higher expense ratios of the -2x group confirms 
the second half of Hypothesis #3 and Charupat and Miu (2014) findings that bearish LETFs 
have higher expense ratios than bullish. 
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5.3 -3x Target 
 The results for the -3x target grouping may be the most puzzling of all. There is a 
significant positive relationship between expense ratio and tracking error with a holding 
period of 21 and 63 days, but it becomes a significant negative relationship at a holding 
period of 126 days. The results for a holding period of 21 or 63 days would support 
Hypothesis #1, that a higher price produces higher tracking error. However, the 126-day 
results refute it.  
 The explanation for these results relates to the effects of compounding in a trending 
market. As shown by Abner (2010), the direction of the underlying ETF’s return will 
impact the direction and size of tracking error for a LETF. Because of this concept and the 
understanding that higher leveraged ETFs experience more of the compounding effect, the 
change in direction of the relationship makes a little more sense. 
 Although there is variation in the results for -3x over different holding periods, the 
negative relationship for expense ratio and tracking error at a holding period of 126 days 
is in agreement with results for -1x and 2x target groups with the same holding period.  
 The sample of -3x LETFs had more tracking error in all holding periods than their 
lower leveraged -2x and -1x partners. These findings agree with Charupat and Miu (2014) 
as well as Hypothesis #2 that the higher target multiple LETFs will have higher tracking 
error than lower targets. 
 Similarly to the -2x and 2x LETFs, the -3x target group had higher expense ratios 
than their 3x counterparts, consistent with findings of Charupat and Miu (2014). The -3x 
group had a higher mean expense ratio (1.01% vs. 1.00%) as well as a lower minimum, 
showing there were higher expense ratios for -3x LETFs than the 3x group (Table 2 and 
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Appendix A). However, the -3x LETFs had lower tracking error than the 3x LETFs (Table 
3) which refutes the first half of Hypothesis #3 and the findings of Charupat and Miu, 2011; 
Shum and Kang 2013) that bearish LETFs have more tracking error than bullish.  
 
5.4 2x Target 
 For the sample of 12 double levered ETFs in the data set, there was a statistically 
significant negative relationship between expense ratio and tracking error that grows as 
holding period increases. At a holding period of 21-days, each basis point increase in 
expense ratio would expect to produce a 1.36% decrease in tracking error. Increasing the 
holding period to 126-days will result in a 7.79% decrease in tracking error for each 
increase of the same increment. The t-stat also grows from -3.32 at 21-days to -12.54 at 
126 days showing that the relationship gets stronger as holding period increases. One 
significant difference from these results and the results for -1x and -3x is the magnitude of 
estimate results. At a holding period of 126-days, a one basis point increase in expense 
ratio would only expect to decrease tracking error 1.11% and 1.82% for the -1x and -3x 
target group respectively, which is much less than 7.79%. These results refute Hypothesis 
#1 and lead us to believe that paying for a higher expense ratio can actually produce lower 
tracking error for 2x LETFs. Ignoring the possible effects of compounding on the LETF 
returns, this could show investors that the tracking error (only 1.24% for a holding period 
of 126-days) can be reduced by paying for the most expensive LETFs in their target group. 
 The sample of 2x LETFs had less tracking error in all holding periods than the 3x 
LETF group. As is the case for all target groups, these findings confirm Charupat and Miu 
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(2014) claims as well as Hypothesis #2, that more levered (higher target ratio) LETFs will 
have higher tracking error than lower targets. 
 The results for 2x target ratio relating to Hypothesis #3 reflect the same results 
mentioned in Section 4.2. The 2x LETFs had more tracking error in all holding periods 
than their bearish counterparts (Table 3), but they also had lower expense ratios on average 
than the 2x target group (Table 2). This result disagreed with the claim of Shum and Kang, 
2013; Charupat and Miu, 2011) that bearish funds have more tracking error than bullish. 
This result also confirms Charupat (2014) that bullish LETFs should have lower expense 
ratios than bearish. 
 
5.5 3x Target 
The 3x target group showed no significant relationship between expense ratio and 
tracking error for any holding period except for 63 days. Because there is no growing 
significance like there is for the 2x and -1x groups, this one period of significance is likely 
due to chance. Although the results returned significance to the 5% level, most of the other 
significant results were to the 1% level. The R2 for this relationship is also the lowest of 
any statistically significant relationship, furthering the point that this result may be a false 
positive. The only other group without a significant relationship was the -2x target group. 
Section 4.2 discusses the uniformity of -2x LETF expense ratios. Unlike the -2x group, the 
sample of 3x LETFs has a wide variety of expense ratios and was still unable to uncover a 
significant relationship. A variety of expense ratios removes data quality as a reasonable 
explanation for the lack of a relationship. This leads me to make the conjecture that 
compounding had a significant effect on 3x returns. The results show no relationship 
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between expense ratio and tracking error for 3x target group, and, because of this, I am 
unable to reject or confirm Hypothesis #1 for the group. 
Hypothesis #2 expected the higher levered ETFs to have more tracking error than 
their lower levered partners. The 3x target group confirmed this hypothesis and had higher 
tracking error than the 2x ETFs for every holding period. A higher target group (more 
levered) having more tracking error agrees with findings of Charupat and Miu (2014) that 
the effects of compounding are more significant for LETFs with more leverage. 
The 3x target group had higher tracking error than the -3x group which disagrees 
with Hypothesis #3, but it did have lower expense ratios which confirms the second half 
of Hypothesis #3. These results refute Charupat and Miu (2011) but confirm the findings 
of Charupat and Miu (2014), that bullish LETFs typically have lower expense ratios 
because of their lower transaction costs. 
 
5.6 Results Further Discussion & Recommendation for Future Research 
Figure 7 below shows the results of this Thesis for hypothesis by target ratio. 
 
Hypothesis #1 was refuted by the regression results which showed a significant 
negative relationship between expense ratio and tracking error for -1x, 2x, and -3x LETFs. 
The -3x did confirm Hypothesis #1 over a holding period of 21 and 63 days. Because there 
were varying results for the -3x target group and no significant results for the 3x and -2x 
target ratios, I hesitate to accept my results for the -1x, -3x (HP of 126) and 2x LETFs as 
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absolute. However, I do trust the analysis I have conducted and think there is more work 
to be done. Controlling for the effects of compounding, volume, volatility, and market 
trends may help paint a clearer picture of the relationship between expense ratios and 
tracking error. In my opinion, the compounding effect is the largest reason why I was 
unable to find significant results for more of the sample. 
 Hypothesis #2 was confirmed across the board for nearly all holding periods. 
LETFs with higher target ratios, or more leverage, experienced higher levels of tracking 
error. These results serve as evidence of the compounding effect. As holding period 
increases, tracking error will also increase due to the effects of compounding, and this 
effect is exacerbated by higher tracking errors. This has been shown by Charupat and Miu 
(2011), Lu, Wang amd Zang (2012), and Bansal and Marshall (2015) among others and 
inclined me to blame the compounding effect for variation in my regression results. 
 For the final hypothesis, I found results across the board that agree with Charupat 
and Miu (2014) that bullish ETFs will have higher expense ratios than bearish LETFs. 
However, I also had data that refuted Charupat and Miu’s (2011) claim that bullish ETFs 
have better, or lower, tracking error than bearish ETFs. In the sample, nearly all bullish 
ETFs actually had more tracking error than their inverse counterparts. Because I confirmed 
part of the hypothesis but refuted the second part, I entered a  
1
2
  box for Hypothesis #3 in 
Figure 7 above. 
The R2 of the regression analysis were low for all target multiples and holding 
periods. The highest R2 of all the regression results is 0.2015, for the -1x target group at a 
126-day holding period. Typically, a low R2 would be an indicator that a large proportion 
of the variance in tracking error is not attributable to changes in expense ratio. However, it 
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is common to have a low coefficient of determination for a regression analysis on LETFs 
and their return data. Elton, Gruber, Comer, and Li (2002), Agapova (2011), Charupat and 
Miu (2011) among others were able to come to significant conclusions despite having R2 
that were at similar levels 
While this Thesis has provided more insight into the pricing and performance of 
LETFs, further research can be done to help investors make informed decisions when 
trading LETFs. I believe it would be insightful to do a Sponsor vs Sponsor test to see if 
there is any significance to how each provider prices or structures their LETF. There were 
only two providers for the sample, Direxion and ProShares, and each had a different make 
up of daily holdings. They also had a much different range of expense ratios. Because of 
this, each sponsor may have significantly different replication strategies for certain target 
ratios or indexes. I feel that research comparing tracking error of ProShares LETFs tracking 
the S&P500 to Direxion LETFs also tracking the S&P500 would help investors understand 
differences in providers, which is just as important as understanding the difference between 
a Chevy and a Ford. 
The analysis conducted in this Thesis could be improved in future research. Using 
a more complex model put forth by Charupat and Miu (2014) to control for the effects of 
financing (transaction costs) and compounding may provide more insight as to what 
proportion of the tracking error is attributable to each variable. However, this method uses 
the NAV method for calculating tracking error which would mitigate our ability to assess 
the expense ratio’s role in creating this error. This Thesis could also benefit from a more 
advanced statistical analysis where factors like volume, volatility, and market direction are 
taken into account. Because LETFs are extremely complicated instruments that have well 
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documented tracking error, it has also been well documented that many factors can 
contribute to this error. As a result, it can be difficult to account for all these factors while 
looking for causality in a single one. As outlined by the literature review, expense ratios 
have been of less focus in LETF literature. However, as the other components of tracking 
error become clearer, more precise research can be conducted on expense ratios and their 
relationship with tracking error. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, this Thesis set out to further understand the relationship between a 
levered or inverse ETF’s expense ratio and its tracking error. The Thesis used a sample of 
54 Index tracking LETFs and return data for the period January 3, 2017 to December 29, 
2017. During the research process, I used the tracking error equation from Bansal and 
Marshall (2015) and regression analysis on tracking error and expense ratios to test for a 
causal relationship between the two. 
The guiding Hypothesis #1 was refuted by the results of a regression analysis on 
tracking error and expense ratio over multiple holding periods. Generally, the results 
support the claim that an increase in expense ratio can decrease tracking error of LETFs, 
and that this relationship is more significant for longer holding periods. However, results 
did vary based on target multiple and holding period, and one target group had results that 
flipped from positive to negative as holding period increased. Because of the varying 
results, further research is needed to understand the relationship between tracking error and 
an LETF’s expense ratio. Specifically, a model that controls for compounding, volatility, 
benchmark index and market trends would provide a much better conclusion on the issue. 
With respect to the second two hypotheses, the results were able to overwhelmingly 
confirm Hypothesis #2 and provide further evidence that tracking error is larger for more 
levered ETFs over all holding periods. This result is likely due to the exacerbating effects 
leverage can have on the compounding effect. Results relating to Hypothesis #3 both 
confirm and refute it. The results showed that bearish LETFs had better tracking error than 
bullish ETFs, refuting Hypothesis #3. However, results also showed bearish LETFs had 
higher expense ratios, confirming the expectations of Hypothesis #3. 
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 This Thesis has added to the growing pool of valuable LETF research. As relatively 
new instruments, there is still much to be learned about the behavior of these levered 
securities. The negative causal relationship between expense ratio and tracking error found 
in this Thesis could be important to investors who are confident in LETF performance over 
holding periods between 21 and 126 days. If investors enter their position with an 
understanding of compounding and LETF tracking error, they may want to pay a higher 
price to decrease this tracking error, so long as the higher price does not outweigh the 
benefits of lower tracking error. Further research is needed before these results can be 
applied to investing without a disclaimer. 
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Appendix A: List of LETFs included in the data set, grouped by target ratio 
    
Match Ticker Fund	Name Underlying	ETF Objective Expense	Ratio
SH ProShares Short S&P500 SPY -1x 0.89%
PSQ ProShares Short QQQ QQQ -1x 0.95%
RWM ProShares Short Russell2000 IWM -1x 0.95%
DOG ProShares Short Dow30 DIA -1x 0.95%
SPDN Direxion Daily S&P 500 Bear 1X Shares SPY -1x 0.56%
MYY ProShares Short MidCap400 MDY -1x 0.95%
SBB ProShares Short SmallCap600 SLY -1x 0.95%
SDS ProShares UltraShort S&P500 SPY -2x 0.89%
QID ProShares UltraShort QQQ QQQ -2x 0.95%
DXD ProShares UltraShort Dow30 DIA -2x 0.95%
TWM ProShares UltraShort Russell2000 IWM -2x 0.95%
BIS ProShares UltraShort Nasdaq Biotechnology IBB -2x 0.95%
SKF ProShares UltraShort Financials XLF -2x 0.95%
MZZ ProShares UltraShort MidCap400 MDY -2x 0.95%
REW ProShares UltraShort Technology XLK -2x 0.95%
SIJ ProShares UltraShort Industrials DIA -2x 0.95%
SDD ProShares UltraShort SmallCap600 SLY -2x 0.95%
SSG ProShares UltraShort Semiconductors SOXX -2x 0.95%
SQQQ ProShares UltraPro Short QQQ QQQ -3x 0.95%
SPXU ProShares UltraPro Short S&P500 SPY -3x 0.90%
TZA Direxion Daily Small Cap Bear 3x Shares IWM -3x 1.10%
SPXS Direxion Daily S&P 500 Bear 3X Shares SPY -3x 1.10%
SDOW ProShares UltraPro Short Dow30 DIA -3x 0.95%
FAZ Direxion Daily Financial Bear 3X Shares XLF -3x 1.10%
LABD Direxion Daily S&P Biotech Bear 3X Shares XBI -3x 1.11%
SRTY ProShares UltraPro Short Russell2000 IWM -3x 0.95%
SOXS Direxion Daily Semiconductor Bear 3x Shares SOXX -3x 1.11%
ZBIO ProShares UltraPro Short Nasdaq Biotechnology IBB -3x 0.95%
SMDD ProShares UltraPro Short MidCap400 MDY -3x 0.95%
SSO ProShares Ultra S&P 500 SPY 2x 0.90%
QLD ProShares Ultra QQQ QQQ 2x 0.95%
UYG ProShares Ultra Financials XLF 2x 0.95%
DDM ProShares Ultra Dow30 DIA 2x 0.95%
BIB ProShares Ultra NASDAQ Biotechnology IBB 2x 0.95%
UWM ProShares Ultra Russell2000 IWM 2x 0.95%
MVV ProShares Ultra MidCap400 MDY 2x 0.95%
USD ProShares Ultra Semiconductors SOXX 2x 0.95%
SAA ProShares Ultra SmallCap600 SLY 2x 0.95%
UXI ProShares Ultra Industrials DIA 2x 0.95%
SPUU Direxion Daily S&P 500 Bull 2x Shares SPY 2x 0.67%
SMLL Direxion Daily Small Cap Bull 2X Shares ETF IWM 2x 0.72%
TQQQ ProShares UltraPro QQQ QQQ 3x 0.95%
FAS Direxion Daily Financial Bull 3x Shares XLF 3x 1.02%
UPRO ProShares UltraPro S&P500 SPY 3x 0.95%
SPXL Direxion Daily S&P 500 Bull 3x Shares SPY 3x 1.04%
TNA Direxion Daily Small Cap Bull 3x Shares IWM 3x 1.11%
SOXL Direxion Daily Semiconductor Bull 3x Shares SOXX 3x 1.02%
UDOW ProShares UltraPro Dow30 DIA 3x 0.95%
LABU Direxion Daily S&P Biotech Bull 3X Shares XBI 3x 1.08%
URTY ProShares UltraPro Russell2000 IWM 3x 0.95%
MIDU Direxion Daily Mid Cap Bull 3x Shares MDY 3x 1.08%
FINU ProShares UltraPro Financial Select Sector XLF 3x 0.95%
UBIO ProShares UltraPro Nasdaq Biotechnology IBB 3x 0.95%
UMDD ProShares UltraPro MidCap400 MDY 3x 0.95%
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Appendix B: Metrics of Measurement 
 
Terminology Definition Calculation 
Expense Ratio 
The price that the investor 
pays to cover the expenses of 
the fund. This figure is 
expressed as a percentage of 
the value of your investment in 
the fund. 
This is selected by the fund 
provider and varies based on their 
target objective, fund construction, 
transactional costs, and other 
variable expenses. 
AUM 
The total market value of all 
the fund’s financial assets at a 
given time. 
Sum of the market value of all 
securities, derivatives and swaps 
agreements owned by the fund. 
Volume 
The number of shares of the 
LETF that are traded that day. 
Sum of all trades during trading 
hours. 
NAV 
The value of each share’s 
portion of the fund’s 
underlying assets, calculated at 
the close of the trading day. 
(𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 − 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠)
# 𝑜𝑓 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
 
Tracking Error 
The deviation between an 
LETF’s return and the 
underlying index or underlying 
ETF’s return multiplied by the 
fund’s target multiple. 
𝑇𝐸 = 𝑓𝑡 − (𝐿𝑖𝑡) 
Where: 
𝑇𝐸 = tracking error 
𝑓𝑡 = LETFs actual return 
𝑖𝑡 = plain vanilla ETF return 
L = target multiple 
Return 
The percentage increase of the 
LETF over a period of time. 
For the case of our study it is 
the percentage return of the 
LETF over one-year. 
Summation of daily return 
percentages for the holding period. 
Bid-Ask 
(Spread) 
The amount that an ask price 
exceeds a bid price for an 
LETF. 
 
𝐴𝑠𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝐵𝑖𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 = 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 
 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑
𝐴𝑠𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
= 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 % 
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Appendix C: SAS code used for Regression analysis 
***tracking error HP 1 year, Regression with expense ratio 
proc reg data=etf2; 
model track_error = expense_ratio; 
run; quit; 
 
proc reg data=etf2; 
model track_error = expense_ratio neg2 neg3 pos2 pos3; 
run; quit; 
 
proc reg data=etf2; 
model track_error = expense_ratio neg2 neg3 pos2 pos3 volume; 
run; quit; 
 
proc reg data=etf2; 
model track_error = expense_ratio neg2 neg3 pos2 pos3 volume bidask; 
run; quit; 
 
proc reg data=etf2; 
model track_error = expense_ratio bidask; 
run; quit; 
***tracking error holding period; 
data etf3; set etf2; 
lag1te=lag1(track_error); 
lag2te=lag2(track_error); 
lag3te=lag3(track_error); 
lag4te=lag4(track_error); 
lag5te=lag5(track_error); 
lag1ticker=lag1(permno); 
lag2ticker=lag2(permno); 
lag3ticker=lag3(permno); 
lag4ticker=lag4(permno); 
lag5ticker=lag5(permno); 
lag6ticker=lag6(permno); 
run; quit; 
 
data etf4; set etf3; 
sum5te = lag1te+lag2te+lag3te+lag4te+lag5te; 
run; quit; 
 
data etf5; set etf4; 
if lag1ticker ne permno then delete; 
run; quit; 
 
proc means n mean median std max min data = etf5; 
var sum5te track_error; 
run; quit; 
Appendix D: Direxion Daily S&P 500 Bull 2x Shares (SPUU) First Page of Prospectus 
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Appendix E: Proshares Ultra Short (QID) – Daily Holdings – 10/11/18 
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